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Abstract
This paper examines the flow of international investment into the United States between
1998 and 2004. The impetus behind the paper was to examine the possible impact the
terrorist act of September 11, 2001 (often alluded to as 9/11) may have had on foreign
direct investment into the United States (defined as inward FDI). The data is reported
both annually and quarterly. First, the annual data between 1998-2004 is reviewed. In
looking at significant differences between the two periods, quarterly data is examined, as
annual aggregation would lead to too few data points. Inward FDI is reported by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis by region and then by individual country. The quarter of
9/11/2001 is omitted as being the event defining quarter. In the dataset collected, there
are 13 quarters pre- and post- the event quarter. At first glance, the world seems to have
definitely lowered its FDI into the United States. However, further examination reveals
that except for France, no other country shows a significant reduction in its investments
into the United States post- 9/11, compared to their average investments pre- 9/11.
/. Introduction
Given the recent debate in the media over ownership and control of
U.S. ports by a Dubai-based foreign firm, this study is a timely examination of
whicli countries have changed their levels of investment into the United States
post-9/11 - relative to their pre-9/11 investment activity. The study also
examines inward FDI by industry.
There has been a lot of coverage in the media about the flight of U.S.
businesses, especially manufacturing, to overseas locations. The commonest
reason cited is the lower cost of wages and/or overheads and the subsequent
greater profitability (or loss avoidance). Public displeasure over the permanent
loss of jobs has been expressed in vocal demonstrations and unfortunate rioting.
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In all the above furor, most debaters tend to overlook the fact that, until
recently, the United States was also the recipient of the largest inflow of foreign
direct investment (inward FDI) in the world, with U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
firms owning over $3.5 trillion in assets. In 1998, foreign owned U.S. assets had
sales of almost $1.9 trillion and employed over 5.6 million people in the U.S
These foreign firms accounted for over 6% of the U.S. total gross product in that
year.
//. Motivation
The motivation behind this paper was primarily to examine whether the
terrorist attack of September 11*, 2001, had had any negative impact on inward
FDI in to the United States. One main concern had to be faced early on. If any
changes were to be observed, there are many potential confounding effects that
may be contributing factors - other than simply businesses being afraid of
terrorist activity. Maniam, Tuey & Chatterjee (2003) specifically point out that
the timing of such foreign investments is affected by exchange rate differentials,
changes in taxation and the stage of the business cycle. We still thought it is an
interesting question to ask, to determine if there had been any changes as a first
step. Given the results, further research by controlling such confounding factors
could help determine causes and effects of the changes noted.
Another potential drawback could be that, if inward FDI has a long
lead-time, would foreign firms be able to immediately react to the 9/11 event?
However, prior research (Cooke, 2001) indicates that the majority of the inward
FDI in the U.S. occurs through mergers and acquisitions. Thus, given any
security concerns, overseas investors can quickly change tack and invest in other
countries, or at least back out of their intended investments in the United States.
///. Literature Review
The most comprehensive and detailed examination of Foreign Direct
Investment into the United States (inward FDI) is provided by Maniam, Tuey &
Chatterjee (2003). Starting with defining inward FDI, the authors offer reasons
why such investments may occur, as well as factors that can help determine the
timing of the same. Maniam et al. (2003) document prior research and mention
the research findings and results of Borga & Mataloni Jr. (2001), Corporate
Location (2001), Howenstine (2001), Meade (1997), Nader (1999) and O'Hagan
& Anderson (2000). Hence, in the interests of brevity, these studies results are
not discussed here.
Amongst other recent pertinent studies, Apfelthaler (2000) is a brief
case study of four small/medium-sized Austrian firms. This study, by looking at
these specific firms and their path to FDI in the U.S., reports on their rationale
behind investing in the United States. This gives rise to the thought, that if our
results show that inward FDI to the U.S. has decreased post- 9/11, a direction for
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further research may be to survey individual firms that did come here and
discover the reasons for their investments.
Cooke (2001) hypothesizes that inward FDI in the U.S. has been
seeking union avoidance. The author states that while prior research on
multinational corporations (MNCs) shows they invest less in countries with
higher levels of union membership and contract coverage, yet no study shows
the effect of such factors on FDI into the United States. By analyzing the decline
in union coverage of foreign corporation in the U.S., the author concludes that
his hypothesis is supported.
Hejazi and Safarian (2001) report that trade and FDI are
complementary. Their analysis finds that U.S. outward FDI has "a larger
predicted impact on U.S. exports than does inward FDI. On the other hand,
inward FDI is found to have a larger predicted impact on U.S. imports than does
U.S. outward FDI."
Zitta and Powers (2003) examine the motives of firms for inward FDI
in the U.S. The authors report that foreign companies arrive seeking either
factors such as technology or a skilled workforce to efficiently manufacture their
products here or markets for either capital or products.
IV. Data and Methodology
The inward U.S. FDI data was collected from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) website, which is part of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The data is reported both in annual aggregates, as well as on a quarterly basis.
Taking the 9/11/2001 quarter as being the "event" quarter, and seeking
symmetry in comparing the pre- and post- data, we collected data from Q2/1998
to Q4/2004. This equates to 13 quarters of inward FDI before the quarter of
9/11, and 13 quarters post 9/11.
The methodology used to identify the differences across sample sub-
periods is a significant difference of means test (T-test) with 1% probability of
significance as the level of interest. Given the number of factors that may
potentially lead to changes in the level of inward FDI, adhering to a stricter level
of significance will raise the bar for noting seemingly significant changes in the
pre- and post- 9/11 capital inflows. The tests are run both by individual
country/region, as well as by industry, as per the NAICS classification.
V. Resutts
The data was examined both annually and quarterly. Presenting the
tabulated inward FDI by quarters over the entire study period was too
cumbersome. This data is available from the authors upon request. The annual
data is presented by region - but again, in the interests of reasonable tabulation,
individual country data is omitted. The country specific data was examined -
and is also available upon request. In reporting the differences in inward U.S.
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FDI during the study period, only the countries with significant changes are
presented. The annual inward FDI data over the study period, 1998-2004, is
presented in Table 1.
The table clearly shows that, over the study period, inward FDI in the
U.S. peaked in the aggregate, by region, as well as for the majority of individual
nations by 2000. This finding supports the following statement from Maniam et
al. (2003): "The era of massive foreign direct investment in the U.S. - a major
source of dollar strength- may be drawing to a close."
Table 1
U.S. INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: CAPITAL INFLOWS ($ MM)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
All countries
Canada
Europe
Latin America and Other
Westem Hemisphere
South and Central America
Other Western Hemisphere
Africa
South Africa
Other
Middle East
Asia and Pacific
174,434
15,959
153,111
-2,569
1,831
-4,400
-601
148
-749
-762
9,295
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
283,376
26,367
223,406
16,929
1,422
15,507
423
113
311
376
15,876
314,007
27,258
251,041
12,741
4,749
7,991
666
216
450
2,389
19,912
159,461
9,173
140,661
8,232
-1,606
9,839
-308
-104
-204
-401
2,104
71,331
1,882
46,525
9,407
4,579
4,828
36
-65
101
1,224
12,257
56,834
12,198
22,731
9,096
4,658
4,438
-23
-38
15
360
12,472
95,859
31,805
41,396
384
3,365
-2,981
-571
-42
-529
508
22,337
Corporate Location (2001) stated that the stock market downturn did
not seem to have had any impact on inward FDI. However, what if this
slowdown in capital inflow was a function of momentum investing, given the
great run of the U.S. economy through the 1990s? Using the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) as a bellwether of the mood for investing in the U.S.
economy, there were no reasons for a slowdown in inward U.S. FDI in 2001,
prior to 9/11. Starting with the week ended January 2, 2001 through August 20,
2001, the index closed in five-digit territory for 30 out of 34 weeks. A possible
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explanation may be the slowdown of the economies of the FDI-making firms'
home countries. Exploring this explanation is a potential topic for future
research. Post 9/11, the DJIA does drop, but surprisingly resilient, is back in
five-digit territory by the first weekend in December. 2002 sees the index in
respectable range through the first half of the year. By contrast, inward U.S. FDI
across the board presents a vastly shrunken flow of investments. Economists
have certified the U.S. recession ended by the last quarter of 2001, so it is less
likely that the unattractiveness of the U.S. economy should be keeping investors
away. A more likely explanation is the continuing weakness of the domestic
economies of the potential investing firms - or their decision to invest
domestically or elsewhere in the world.
Table 2 presents the annual inward FDI data for the study period by industry
using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System)
classification. This data shows that for inward FDI as a whole, except for a
couple of industries, annual foreign capital inflows have been falling since 1999-
2000. The difference in individual manufacturing was Electrical Equipment,
Appliances and Components, which had its inward FDI peak in 2001. Over the
study period. Retail Trade also peaked in 2001, while Information industry saw
a surge in the same year before dropping off drastically in 2002. The other
noteworthy industry change is in Finance and Insurance (excluding depository
institutions), which having peaked in 2000 and troughed in 2002, shows a surge
in 2004, the last year of the study.
Table 3 presents the averages of the two periods under study, namely
the 13 quarters of inward FDI pre- 9/11 and the 13 quarters of inward FDI post-
9/11. This data is presented in columns one and two respectively. Column 3 is a
T-test to compare whether the means across these two groups are significantly
different. As mentioned earlier, it was decided to use a stricter measure of the
1% level of significance to highlight if there are any changes in the levels of
inward FDI between the two periods. The overall inward FDI by all countries is
seen to be significantly lower at the 1% level. The post 9/11 quarterly average is
a little over $19 billion compared to a pre 9/11 average of about $55 billion. In
looking at regional differences, only Europe is seen to be significantly lower,
having dropped to an average of about $10 billion from the earlier average of
about $44.8 billion. This finding again supports Maniam et al. (2003), where the
authors in explaining why pending acquisitions by foreign investors were down
state, "The main cause is a drop in direct investment from Europe". However,
while the aggregate from Europe is significantly lower, in examining individual
countries it is seen that only France has significantly lowered its U.S. inward
FDI post 9/11, relative to its average investments pre 9/11. Given the recent
political climate between the two nations, one possibility is that French
corporations may be staying away from the U.S. for reasons other than the risk
of terrorist activity. The only other country to show a significant difference is
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Table 2
U.S. INWARD FDI. CAPITAL INFLOWS ($ MM) BY NAICS INDUSTRY
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Manufacturing
Food
Chemicals
Primary & fabr. metals
Machinery
Computers & electronic prod.
Electrical equip, appl., & comp.
Transportation equipment
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Information
Depository institutions
Finance (except dep inst) & insur.
Real estate and rental and leasing
Prof, scientific & tech. services
Other industries
Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis
1998
140,727
1,158
7,445
1,217
2,047
18,428
1,866
38,553
11,034
3,327
1,746
5,420
6,617
2,118
1,472
1,972
1999
82,382
-1,637
7,435
2,881
17,878
29,481
4,206
7,153
16,458
3,335
8i,894
19,471
35,185
5,948
5,826
32,876
2000
105,119
2,281
25,466
8,199
2,175
33,073
13,333
1,653
52,501
4,111
25,207
5,775
50,990
3,473
34,136
32,695
2001
51,069
312
16,823
-3,109
3,560
-1,403
20,545
9,694
5,998
5,881
51,472
6,429
18,156
-2,178
9,309
13,326
2002
25,715
1,300
-6,629
629
5,176
-6,648
3,182
5,797
10,689
51
4,958
2,756
2,896
2,615
1,241
20,411
2003
14,888
-242
1,115
19
611
-2,043
-959
3,332
-5,762
1,506
9,458
4,094
19,445
-2,706
186
15,725
2004
19,372
2,273
7,485
1,211
937
-784
1,064
4,560
15,311
1,810
-4,632
16,220
31,835
2,542
4,425
8,976
4376 The International Journal of Finance
Table 3
U.S. INWARD FDI: QUARTERLY CAPITAL INFLOWS ($ MM)
All countries, all industries
PRE 9/11 POST 9/11 T-TEST
AVG/QTR AVG/QTR
55,072.83 19,440.23 0.0008
Canada
Europe
France
Latin America and Other
Westem Hemisphere
South and Central America
Panama
Other Westem Hemisphere
Africa
South Africa
Other
Middle East
Asia and Pacific
BOLD = significant difference at 1% level
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
4,417.22 4,076.85 0.8619
44,863.17 10,200.54 0.0005
6,473.11 1,676.77 0.0034
2,284.17
399.11
3.72
1,885.11
62.89
28.22
34.89
152.11
3,293.22
1,587.92
889.00
466.31
698.92
-101.00
-74.67
-32.15
148.62
3,527.08
0.5490
0.5176
0.0074
0.1977
0.1036
0.1278
0.3904
0.9804
0.8602
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U,S, INWARD FDI: QUARTERLY CAPITAL INFLOWS ($ MM) BY NAICS INDUSTRY
Manufacturing
Food
Chemicals
Primary and fabricated metals
Machinery
Computers and electronic products
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components
Transportation equipment
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Information
Depository institutions
Finance (except dep, institutions) and insurance
Real estate and rental and leasing
Professional, scientific, and technical services
Other industries
BOLD = significant difference at 1 % level
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
PRE 9/11
AVG/QTR
22,083,56
205,50
3,496,67
643,33
1,570,78
4,710,17
1,059,94
3,224,06
5,419,33
969,72
8,818,50
2,310,78
7,178,06
801,33
2,945,50
4,545,83
POST 9/11
AVG/QTR
5,513,62
156,85
1,088,92
9,23
686,23
-870,92
1,053,36
1,071,46
1,443,62
393,31
1,473,23
1,955,54
4,552,00
27,85
394,00
3,687,15
T-TESl
0.0037
0,8751
0,0987
0,1238
0,4209
0.0002
0,9942
0,2858
0,1092
0,2275
0,0761
0,7760
0,3116
0,0692
0,0191
0,6074
Panama, and this is a positive difference in that it has increased its U.S. inward
FDI post 9/11. This, however, may be due to the fact that they had a very low
average in the comparative pre 9/11 period of just $3.7 billion.
Table 4 repeats the T-test of significant difference of means for U.S.
inward FDI pre and post 9/11 by industry. While investment in aggregate
manufacturing is seen to be significantly lower, the only industry to show a
significant difference is the computers and electronic products manufacturing.
This is not surprising as it is the only industry that has an average showing net
capital outflows by foreign corporations, whereby they are just emulating their
American counterparts who have also sought lower cost efficiencies elsewhere.
Thus, while at first glance, the numbers for U.S. inward FDI seemed to
have dramatically reduced post 9/11, reassuringly the picture is that the changes
are less drastic than they superficially appear to be.
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V. Conclusion and Summary
This study decided to examine whether inward FDI in the United States
was adversely affected by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. On
beginning the research, it was realized that while changes in inward FDI would
be easy to quantify, it would be harder to ascribe the changes to any specific
reason such as fear of potential fiiture terrorist attacks. However, at least
examining whether the levels of investment differed post 9/11 was thought of as
an important first step in our research.
At first glance, the changes in inward FDI post 9/11 appear to be huge.
There is no gainsaying that the dollar amounts seem materially different.
According to the data, the overall inward FDI grew from a little over $175
billion in 1998 to peak at about $314 billion in 2000 - and then slumped to
about $56 billion in 2003. In 2004, however, it has climbed back a bit to almost
$96 billion.
However, on examining the statistical significant difference of means,
the picture is far more reassuring. At a 1% level of significance, it is seen that
though the overall inward U.S. FDI is significantly different between the pre and
post 9/11 periods, the only country to have significantly lower capital
investments in the U.S. is France. While it is possible that this may be a political
decision rather than an economic one, trying to determine why this result was
found is a topic for future research. Based on our research, the fact that post 9/11
there is no significantly lower inward fiow of foreign capital to the United States
across the board, one could conclude that by the end of 2004, generally foreign
investors do not see any potential threat of fiiture terrorist activity as a deterrent
to their continued investment in the United States.
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